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Malware Static Triage // COFF & PE32/PE32+

Portable Executable PE Header & Entropy Inspector

Dissect Windows PE/COFF binaries, DLLs, and sys drivers in real time. Inspect DOS headers, section virtual/raw boundaries, compile timestamps, ASLR/DEP exploit mitigations, and calculate Shannon entropy per section to detect UPX packers, cryptors, and W^X memory violations.

Supports PE32 (x86), PE32+ (x64) & ARM64
Shannon Entropy & W^X Violation Heuristics
Zero File Upload • 100% In-Browser Memory
> STATIC TRIAGE ENGINE PE32+ 64-BIT
DOS Signature: 0x5A4D (MZ)
e_lfanew Offset: 0x000000E8
PE Magic: 0x00004550 (PE\0\0)
• PACKER HEURISTICS ACTIVE

Drop suspect PE binary (.exe, .dll, .sys, .scr) or click to browse

Extracts headers, section boundaries, compile stamps, and calculates Shannon entropy on initial blocks in milliseconds. Zero bytes are uploaded or saved to any cloud infrastructure.

Analyzed File
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0 bytes
Machine Architecture
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Compile Timestamp (UTC)
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Total Sections & Overall Entropy
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Analyzing...

Portable Executable Section Table

Virtual memory mapping vs. raw disk boundaries and calculated Shannon entropy (0.0 - 8.0).

< 6.2 Normal 6.2-6.8 High > 6.8 Packed/Encrypted
Section Name Virtual Size Virtual Address (RVA) Raw Size (Disk) Raw Offset Permissions Shannon Entropy Forensic Status

Automated Static Analysis Heuristic Evaluation

Scans for anomalies including W^X memory violations, known packer signatures, timestomping, and header misalignments.

MS-DOS 2.0 Header (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER)
e_magic (Magic)0x5A4D (MZ)
e_cblp (Bytes on last page)--
e_cp (Pages in file)--
e_crlc (Relocations)--
e_cparhdr (Header paragraph size)--
e_lfanew (PE Header Offset)--
COFF File Header (IMAGE_FILE_HEADER)
PE Signature0x00004550 (IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
Machine Architecture--
NumberOfSections--
TimeDateStamp--
PointerToSymbolTable--
NumberOfSymbols--
SizeOfOptionalHeader--
Characteristics Flags--
Optional Header Standard Fields
Magic Format--
AddressOfEntryPoint--
ImageBase--
SectionAlignment--
FileAlignment--
SizeOfImage--
SizeOfHeaders--
Subsystem--
CheckSum--
Exploit Mitigations & DllCharacteristics
• Exploit Defense Profile: Modern legitimate software enforces ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) and DEP/NX (Data Execution Prevention) to stop memory corruption attacks. Binaries missing ASLR or DEP are often legacy components or custom malware loaders engineered to run shellcode in predictable memory allocations.

Optional Header Data Directories

Pointers to the 16 standard PE table directories in memory.

Index Directory Name Virtual Address (RVA) Size (Bytes) Section Location

Understanding the Windows Portable Executable (PE) Architecture

In digital forensics, malware reverse engineering, and threat triage, the Portable Executable (PE) format is the ubiquitous binary standard for Windows executable files (.exe), dynamic link libraries (.dll), kernel drivers (.sys), and control panel applets (.cpl). Designed by Microsoft as a derivation of the Common Object File Format (COFF), every Windows binary begins with an MS-DOS legacy stub and cascades into structural headers that dictate how Windows loads machine code into virtual memory.

Anatomy of PE Headers in Malware Static Triage

Static analysis examines an executable without executing code, preserving sandbox environments and preventing triggering malicious kill-switches. Forensic examiners focus on five core structures:

1. The MS-DOS 2.0 Stub & e_lfanew

Initiates with magic bytes 4D 5A (ASCII: MZ). At offset 0x3C sits the critical 4-byte pointer e_lfanew, specifying the exact byte offset where the true modern PE header begins.

2. COFF TimeDateStamp Forensics

Records the Unix epoch compilation timestamp. When attackers use timestomping utilities to forge creation dates (e.g. setting timestamps to 2012 or a date in 2038), the anomaly immediately surfaces in timeline cross-examinations.

3. Relative Virtual Addresses (RVA)

Pointers in the PE header are Relative Virtual Addresses (RVA)—offsets from the base address in memory (ImageBase). Understanding RVAs allows investigators to locate the entry point and exported functions.

4. Exploit Mitigation Flags

The DllCharacteristics word reveals whether ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization), DEP/NX (Data Execution Prevention), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) were enabled by the compiler.

Shannon Entropy & Automated Packer Detection

Claude Shannon's Entropy measures the statistical randomness and information density of a byte array on a scale from 0.0 to 8.0:

Entropy Threshold Scale: 0.0 - 5.0 (Plain text / padding) • 5.8 - 6.4 (Typical compiled x86/x64 machine code) • > 6.8 (Encrypted, compressed, or packed payloads)

Packers (such as UPX, Themida, ASPack, or custom obfuscators) compress the original binary code and wrap it in a tiny execution stub. When an examiner inspects the section headers, three tell-tale signatures emerge:

  • High Code Entropy: The primary executable section exhibits an entropy greater than 7.0 (often exceeding 7.8).
  • Virtual vs. Raw Size Mismatch: In UPX, the UPX0 section often has a SizeOfRawData of 0 on disk, but a VirtualSize of hundreds of kilobytes, reserving uninitialized memory for runtime decompression.
  • W^X (Write-Execute) Violation: The section characteristics enable both IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE and IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, indicating self-modifying code.

Standard PE Section Names Reference

Section Name Standard Purpose Normal Characteristics Forensic Suspicion Flags
.text / CODE Executable CPU instructions Read, Execute (R-X) Entropy > 6.8 or Writable (W) enabled
.data Initialized global & static variables Read, Write (RW-) Executable (X) enabled or high entropy embedded payload
.rdata / .idata Read-only constants, imports, strings Read Only (R--) Missing import directory or zero imports
.rsrc Embedded application resources (icons, manifests) Read Only (R--) Embedded second PE binary disguised in raw RCDATA
.reloc Base relocation table for ASLR rebasing Read Only (R--) Stripped relocations in a DLL (violates Windows standards)
UPX0 / UPX1 Ultimate Packer for eXecutables compressed stub Read, Write, Execute (RWX) Definitive proof of binary compression

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Shannon entropy quantifies the randomness and information density of a byte sequence on a scale from 0.0 (uniform repetition) to 8.0 (pure cryptographic randomness). In compiled PE executables, typical machine code in the .text section has an entropy between 5.8 and 6.4. An entropy exceeding 7.0 strongly indicates that the section contains encrypted shellcode, compressed data, or has been processed by a packer such as UPX, Themida, or VMProtect.

The W^X principle dictates that memory should never be simultaneously Writable and Executable to prevent arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities. When a section's Characteristics header has both IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE (0x80000000) and IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE (0x20000000) flags enabled, it represents a high-severity heuristic indicator of self-modifying code, an unpacking stub, or in-memory shellcode injection.

Every valid PE file header contains a 32-bit TimeDateStamp field in the COFF header representing the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 UTC. Threat actors often modify this timestamp (timestomping) to blend malware into system directories. Examiners identify timestomping when the PE header timestamp contradicts file system $STANDARD_INFORMATION or $FILE_NAME timestamps, shows a date in the distant future, or predates the release of the compiler or operating system.

No. Under ForensicsInsider's strict Zero-Upload covenant, files are analyzed entirely within your local browser memory using the JavaScript FileReader and DataView APIs. Zero bytes are uploaded or transmitted over the internet.