Verify YARA rule syntax and test pattern matching against files, scripts, or memory dumps directly in your browser. Evaluates text strings, hex byte wildcards (??), regex patterns, wide/ascii encodings, and boolean conditions with zero server upload.
| Identifier | Pattern Type | Target String | Status | Hits Count | Byte Offsets (Hex) |
|---|
In enterprise security operations and digital forensics investigations, YARA is the premier pattern-matching swiss army knife for malware classification and threat hunting. Written by Victor Alvarez, YARA enables investigators to describe suspicious artifacts by combining text, hexadecimal sequences, and regular expressions with boolean conditions.
Windows binaries (.NET, PE32+, COM objects) and PowerShell scripts heavily utilize 2-byte UTF-16LE characters. Adding wide tells YARA to match null-interleaved characters (e.g. c\x00m\x00d\x00).
• Best Practice: Always use ascii wide nocase together for string indicators unless you specifically intend to constrain matches to raw 8-bit ASCII.
When tracking compiled malware shellcode, instruction offsets change between builds. Hexadecimal strings allow single-nibble wildcards (?A), full-byte wildcards (??), and flexible byte jumps ([4-12]).
• Example: $shellcode = { E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 58 83 C0 [4] FF D0 } matches variable function calls without breaking on compiler relocations.
YARA evaluates conditions from left to right. Placing quick magic byte checks like uint16(0) == 0x5A4D (checking for MZ header) or filesize < 5MB before complex regular expressions drastically accelerates enterprise endpoint scanning.
• Performance Rule: Never evaluate unanchored regular expressions across massive binaries without scoping them to file headers or size boundaries.
Matching generic terms like net, cmd, or start without the fullword modifier triggers hits on harmless strings like internet, command, or restarted.
• Investigation Tip: Applying fullword guarantees that the matched sequence is bounded by non-alphanumeric characters.
| Modifier / Construct | Syntax Example | Target Encoding / Behavior | Incident Response Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| nocase | "powershell" nocase |
Case-insensitive matching | Catches obfuscation like PoWeRsHeLl.eXe |
| wide | "cmd.exe" wide |
UTF-16LE 2-byte null interleaved | Required for Windows Unicode Registry and PE strings |
| ascii | "http://" ascii |
Standard 1-byte 8-bit ASCII | Matches raw ASCII payloads, HTTP headers, and scripts |
| fullword | "net" fullword |
Word boundary delimiter | Eliminates false positives on compound words |
| Hex Wildcard | { 55 8B EC ?? ?? 5D } |
Byte-level fuzzy matching | Detects polymorphic shellcode and API call stubs |
| Condition Logic | any of ($a*) and not $b |
Boolean set quantification | Permits flexible rules and suppresses known benign hits |
$a and $b), boolean negations (not $c), grouped expressions (($a or $b) and $c), count threshold quantifiers (all of them, any of them), and wildcard prefix matching (any of ($prefix*)).